

# MISSION CREEP:

Expanding Attacks on Gender Threaten  
the United Nations



© 2024 Ipas

Suggested citation: Zoë Schott. (2024). Mission Creep: Expanding Attacks on Gender Threaten the United Nations. Ipas: Chapel Hill, NC.

Thank you to Jamie Vernaelde, Gillian Kane, Bia Galli and all the advocates who contributed their expertise to this research.

Ipas works to advance reproductive justice by expanding access to abortion and contraception, using a comprehensive approach that addresses health, legal and social systems. We believe every person should have the right to bodily autonomy and be able to determine their own future. Across Africa, Asia and the Americas, we work with partners to ensure that reproductive health services, including abortion and contraception, are available and accessible to all.

Ipas is a registered 501(c)(3) nonprofit organization. All contributions to Ipas are tax deductible to the full extent allowed by law.

# Ipas

P.O. Box 9990  
Chapel Hill, NC 27515 USA  
1.919.967.7052  
ContactUs@ipas.org  
www.ipas.org

# Table of Contents

Abbreviations and Acronyms.....	<b>4</b>
Executive Summary and Key Recommendations.....	<b>5</b>
Introduction.....	<b>11</b>
Before the Trend: The Anti-Gender Movement’s Early Priorities.....	<b>14</b>
A Brief History of Anti-Gender Activity at the UN.....	<b>14</b>
An Emboldened Anti-Gender Movement.....	<b>16</b>
The Unexpected Trend.....	<b>18</b>
A Sharp Rise in Anti-Gender Activity in Unexpected Spaces.....	<b>19</b>
Coordination among Anti-Gender Member States.....	<b>22</b>
Gender: Any Mention, Anywhere.....	<b>24</b>
Implications.....	<b>27</b>
National Sovereignty Against Gender and Human Rights.....	<b>29</b>
Chilling Effect by Targeting Funding.....	<b>30</b>
Narrowing Institutional Space.....	<b>32</b>
Conclusion and Recommendations.....	<b>34</b>
Future Negotiations to Watch.....	<b>36</b>
Methodology.....	<b>38</b>
Future Research.....	<b>38</b>
Appendix I: Anti-Gender Opposition at CFS Case Study.....	<b>40</b>
Appendix II: Matrix of Case Details.....	<b>43</b>
Appendix III: Country Codes.....	<b>49</b>

# Abbreviations and Acronyms

<b>C-Fam</b>	Center for Family and Human Rights
<b>CFS</b>	Committee on World Food Security
<b>CFS voluntary guidelines</b>	Committee on World Food Security Voluntary Guidelines on Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment in the context of Food Security and Nutrition
<b>CPD</b>	Commission on Population and Development
<b>CSE</b>	Comprehensive sexuality education
<b>CSO</b>	Civil society organization
<b>CSW</b>	Commission on the Status of Women
<b>FAO</b>	Food and Agriculture Organization
<b>FWI</b>	Family Watch International
<b>GBV</b>	Gender-based violence
<b>HRC</b>	Human Rights Council
<b>ILO</b>	International Labor Organization
<b>LGBTQ+</b>	Lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, intersex, and queer
<b>OHCHR</b>	United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
<b>OIC</b>	Organization of Islamic Cooperation
<b>SOGI</b>	Sexual orientation and gender identity
<b>SRHR</b>	Sexual and reproductive health and rights
<b>UN</b>	United Nations
<b>UNGA</b>	United Nations General Assembly
<b>UNHCR</b>	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
<b>US</b>	United States
<b>WHA</b>	World Health Assembly
<b>WHO</b>	World Health Organization
<b>WIPO</b>	World Intellectual Property Organization

# Executive Summary and Key Recommendations

Some UN member states—[united by opposition to the manufactured moral panic of “gender ideology”](#)—are intensifying their attacks on UN spaces that are not primarily dedicated to gender issues. These states seek to roll back gender equality and SRHR, as well as the human rights of women, girls and LGBTQ+ people. They are part of a global “anti-gender” movement that has [long worked](#) at the UN to block initiatives advancing gender equality, abortion, CSE and LGBTQ+ rights by weakening language in policy-setting documents and undermining multilateral forums meant to further gender equality and advance human rights.

At the 2019 session of the Committee on World Food Security (CFS), all 126 United Nations (UN) Member States—except Russia—[agreed](#) to address the global crisis of women and girls’ [disproportionate](#) food insecurity. By 2023, eight other countries had joined Russia in holding [2.4 billion](#) food insecure people hostage to a worldview that does not consider the needs and priorities of this demographic. Over a four-year period, a near-consensus project turned into an intractable quagmire when Russia and its ideological allies, including the Holy See and Indonesia, created [havoc](#) in the drafting process of a set of guidelines meant to address gender inequality in the context of food insecurity. They removed or diluted language addressing gendered barriers to food security and acknowledging [women’s gender diversity](#). The guidelines were [delayed](#) by a year: the final product was significantly weakened and did not meaningfully attend to the needs of food insecure women and girls.

CFS is not the only multilateral space where battles over gender are playing out. Indeed, the CFS experience forecasted a shift in strategy for states who oppose gender equality, sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR), and the universality of human rights. [Previously](#), anti-gender states and their civil society [allies focused their efforts](#) on UN spaces dedicated to advancing gender, women’s rights and reproductive health. They have been particularly active at gender-focused UN annual conferences like the [Commission on Population and Development](#) (CPD) and the [Commission on the Status of Women](#) (CSW).

There, anti-gender campaigning against abortion, comprehensive sexuality education (CSE) and other critical human rights topics is a [predictable](#) obstacle for advocates and State delegations seeking to make progress on these issues.

Former US President Donald Trump's presidency [was defined](#) by its work [to limit human rights](#) at the United Nations (UN), as well as their efforts to bring other member states into their fold. A [2019 investigation](#) into the Trump administration's work at the UN identified concerted attempts to prevent any reference to "gender" by both the US mission to the UN and member states in the Arab Group. Notably, both the US and Arab Group members were pulling from talking points directly traced to the US anti-abortion group the Center for Family and Human Rights (C-Fam).

As the anti-gender movement has grown in [influence](#), it is opening new fronts and moving into spaces dedicated to issues other than gender. Without abandoning their usual haunts, anti-gender states are advancing in UN spaces where their issues are an unexpected feature of debate.<sup>1</sup> They are blocking progress on issues like hunger, infectious disease and crimes against humanity, and even creating conflict in more prosaic areas like UN operations and administration. In these spaces, anti-gender states attempt to water down language on gender and insert provisions exempting them from accountability based on national sovereignty or cultural context. The result is often an outcome with lower human rights standards, which harms historically marginalized people whose rights and personal wellbeing stand to benefit from the norms and protections set in the halls of the UN.

## The Cases

To better understand this trend, Ipas analyzed 13 cases of anti-gender campaigning in unexpected UN spaces from 2019 to 2023. These included CFS, a treaty on crimes against humanity, World Health Organization (WHO) strategies, UN agencies' programs and budget, and more. Increasingly, UN fora address cross-cutting recognition of gender inequality in human rights and international development to promote equity. As a result, some of the gender

---

1. Here, both Member States and Observer States like the Holy See are referred to as "member states." While observer states cannot vote, they still have normative impact on outcomes and so have also been included in this analysis.

language appearing in the cases studied is new to those contexts. These cases were identified by civil society advocates in interviews conducted by Ipas in September and October of 2023. Advocate testimony was corroborated by primary evidence from official UN documents, proceeding records, country statements, document drafts and media articles.

Case	Date	Detail
1	January 2019 – April 2023	<a href="#">Crimes against humanity treaty</a>
2	October – December 2020	The <a href="#">CFS voluntary guidelines</a> addressed gender inequality in food security
3	February – June 2021	<a href="#">Global AIDS Strategy</a>
4	April – June 2021	Political declaration on HIV/AIDS set <a href="#">new targets</a> for ending AIDS
5	June – October 2021	World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) <a href="#">Independent Advisory Oversight Committee Report</a>
6	November 2021 – May 2023	<a href="#">Right to development treaty</a>
7	January – May 2022	WHO global health sector strategies <a href="#">guide</a> efforts on HIV and more
8	January – May 2023	WHO global strategy focused on <a href="#">infection prevention</a>
9	January – May 2023	WHO <a href="#">program and budget</a>
10	January – June 2023	ILO <a href="#">program and budget</a>
11	March – June 2023	WIPO <a href="#">program of work and budget</a>
12	July 2023	53rd Human Rights Council (HRC) resolution <a href="#">strengthening</a> Colombian peace process
13	August – September 2023	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) <a href="#">program budget</a>

During the five-year period measured, the leaders of anti-gender campaigning included the Holy See, Russia, and member states from the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and the [African Group](#). From these groups, Egypt and Nigeria were particularly vocal. For a detailed analysis of the 13 cases, please see the full report.

Together these cases demonstrate not only an escalated effort to advance anti-gender goals in unexpected UN spaces but an increasingly coordinated and systematic one. In the five years studied, beginning with the CFS case, the number of yearly obstructions rose from one to nine, while the number of states involved jumped from six to 90. Research demonstrated that these states are working in coordinated groups, enhancing their ability to wrangle cooperation on joint anti-gender negotiation positions.

Anti-gender actors [acknowledge](#) their growing [dedication](#) to monitoring the entire UN system. Our case studies show that language related to gender and minority rights is targeted and opposed systematically. This occurs even in [technical reports](#), [UN agency budgets](#) and other administrative documents, including seemingly minor ones like [agencies' internal staffing guidelines](#). Now, [any mention of gender](#) is vulnerable to attack, which has direct implications for rights holders and for the UN's responses to crisis issues like hunger, development and conflict.

The degree to which certain states have attacked language that was previously agreed by consensus—sometimes even in previous iterations of the same texts—suggests an evolution in their approach to systematically opposing gender language wherever it appears. This results in weaker outcome documents, which in turn hampers UN institutions and their programmatic implementation. And it forms part of a broader, deliberate anti-gender effort to undermine multilateralism and the international human rights system. This includes defunding, discrediting and weakening the consensus from which multilateral institutions derive their authority. Our investigation illustrates a movement to claw back human rights and 'restore' a patriarchal world order that anti-gender groups believe has been lost.

### **Key Recommendations**

The trend of more aggressive, intrusive and coordinated attacks on gender should concern those who seek to advance gender equality, but it should also trouble anyone invested in the UN as a mechanism for productive international cooperation on global issues.



These efforts can be countered by an intersectional human rights response that is cross-cutting, bold and prepared to defend the universality of human rights. This movement should embed respect for human rights across all the mandates and agenda-setting documents of UN bodies. It must formalize meaningful [civil society participation](#) in all policy processes that lack them. Meanwhile, state allies should remain steadfast on their commitments to gender no matter where debates occur and must refuse to allow human rights to be used as a bargaining chip in negotiations. Only through bold cooperation can the erosion of universal human rights be prevented.

From these 13 cases, we highlight three key trends and recommend approaches to combatting them. Additional suggestions on how to counter anti-gender organizing follow in the report's conclusions and recommendations.

**1. Governments should [mainstream training](#) on gender equality and human rights for diplomats working across all issue area, and support them to identify and respond to anti-gender tactics.**

Anti-gender states [often win](#) concessions in these unexpected spaces because delegates are more likely to deprioritize gender in favor of other issues or inadvertently agree to weak language.

**2. Feminist advocates should improve intersectional partnership and [collaboration and information-sharing](#) with civil society organizations (CSOs) from other social justice and human rights movements. Civil society should work with delegations to prepare mitigation strategies for upcoming negotiations in unexpected spaces.**

Because feminist advocates and allied delegations have not historically encountered anti-gender opposition in these UN spaces, they have not been prepared to counter it.

**3. Feminist advocates and delegations should boldly and consistently counter anti-gender statements for state champions.**

Anti-gender states coordinate their positions in groups, lending them political weight. Feminists and intersectional allies from civil society should disrupt this by engaging more in unexpected spaces, as the relative absence of feminist civil society in these fora means fewer experienced advocates who can provide support.

Below is a partial list of UN spaces likely to experience similar anti-gender attention in the near future. These include some of the negotiations discussed in this report, which are ongoing. Progressive actors should monitor and respond to anti-gender initiatives in every UN space. We suggest prioritizing the following:

- May to June 2024: 77th session of the World Health Assembly ([WHA](#))
- May 2024: Pandemic Prevention, Preparedness and Response [Accord](#)
- June 2024: The UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization [Program and Budget Renewal](#)
- September 2024: [Summit of the Future](#)
- 2024: [Right Development Treaty](#) and [Extrajudicial, Summary, or Arbitrary Executions Resolution](#)
- 2025: [Elections Resolution](#) and [World Social Summit](#)
- 2026: [High-level meeting on HIV/AIDS](#)

In addition to the negotiations listed, advocates should also closely monitor WHO, UNHCR, WIPO and the other UN agencies whose cyclical budget renewal processes have come under assault in recent years—these processes are becoming more politicized and may be targeted again in the future. Advocates must prepare to expect anti-gender activity across all thematic areas and processes from political negotiations to the internal staffing policies of UN agencies.

# Introduction

At the 2019 session of the Committee on World Food Security (CFS), all 126 United Nations (UN) Member States—except Russia—[agreed](#) to address the global crisis of women and girls’ [disproportionate](#) food insecurity. By 2023, eight other countries had joined Russia in holding [2.4 billion](#) food insecure people hostage to a worldview that does not consider the needs and priorities of this demographic. Over a four-year period, a near-consensus project turned into an intractable quagmire when Russia and its ideological allies, including the Holy See and Indonesia, created [havoc](#) in the drafting process of a set of guidelines meant to address gender inequality in the context of food insecurity. They removed or diluted language addressing gendered barriers to food security and acknowledging [women’s gender diversity](#). The guidelines were [delayed](#) by a year: the final product was significantly weakened and did not meaningfully attend to the needs of food insecure women and girls.

Historically, anti-gender states have mostly focused on UN convenings, policymaking processes and specialized agencies (here described generally as UN “spaces”) dedicated to advancing gender issues. These include CSW and the UN Population Fund. States that seek to advance gender equality and their feminist allies from civil society have learned to expect anti-gender opposition in these spaces and come prepared to defend against them, monitor their activities and develop strategies to counter their positions.

However, in recent years, anti-gender states have broadened their reach, growing more active in UN spaces whose primary focus is not gender. These include the UN’s mechanisms on food security, intellectual property, education, equitable development and more. They are entering these spaces in large part because of the UN’s increasing progress towards advancing women’s and girls’ rights and the recognition that gender equality is a condition for sustainable development. These efforts are often—though not always—the target of anti-gender opposition. Feminist advocates have not traditionally monitored or anticipated this evolution of activity.<sup>2</sup> As a result, they and likeminded UN State delegations have limited capacity to respond to their tactics.

---

2. For this report, an “unexpected” UN space is a UN convening, decision-making process, agency, or program where feminist advocates and like-minded member state representatives have not historically expected to face anti-gender opposition because the primary goal or mandate of the space is not to advance gender equality, SRHR, or LGBTQ+ rights.

## How the UN Works

The UN's work can be conceptually divided into two parts:

1. It [convenes](#) member states to cooperate on global issues and set policy. The negotiations that take place within these forums are here referred to as “political processes.” For example, all member states convene at the UN General Assembly (UNGA), the UN's main policy-making forum, to negotiate the full range of international issues. The UN also houses [HRC](#), a forum where states work together on the protection and promotion of human rights. States also meet to discuss specific issues in forums like the [high-level meeting on HIV/AIDS](#), and the annual CSW or CPD.
2. The UN implements states' decisions through many [specialized agencies, related organizations, funds and programs](#). Examples include [WHO](#), the [UN Development Program](#) and [UN Population Fund](#). For simplicity, these are referred to here as UN “agencies.”

This anti-gender mission creep is impeding the UN's efforts to advance gender equality and women's and girls' rights. It has also weakened, delayed and even prevented UN work on other important issues while undermining the institution's credibility and capacity and even bringing UN agencies' very existence into question by [interfering with their budget approval processes](#).

Though [earlier research](#) has addressed the implications of anti-gender campaigning in multilateral spaces not dedicated to gender issues, our report is the first to focus on the UN's unexpected spaces as deliberate, more coordinated and systematic sites of anti-gender campaigning. Here we investigate a pattern of 13 cases of anti-gender activity in unexpected UN spaces from 2019 to 2023, showing how these efforts undermine both gender equality and the institutions meant to advance it.

Analyzing these states' behavior and rhetoric in these negotiations, we find that many of the tactics used are the same applied in gender-focused UN spaces. However, the same tactics have unique and sometimes more severe implications when deployed in UN spaces less equipped to mitigate these attacks.




Figure 1: How states influence political UN processes, agencies, and documents.

# Before the Trend: The Anti-Gender Movement's Early Priorities

## A Brief History of Anti-Gender Activity at the UN

Anti-gender actors have been [mobilizing](#) at the UN and in [other intergovernmental fora](#) since the 1990s. [Initially](#), the Holy See, some Catholic and Muslim-majority States, and anti-gender CSOs led this work. The Holy See [developed and advanced](#) the term “gender ideology”—a [catch-all](#) phrase used to disparage feminist advocacy and induce moral panic. They [campaigned](#) against attempts to advance gender equality, women’s and girls’ rights and SRHR at the landmark International Conference on Population and Development in Cairo in 1994 and the Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing in 1995. In 1998, the Catholic Church [successfully advocated](#) for a binary definition of gender in the Rome Statute, an internationally agreed treaty that established the [International Criminal Court](#).

In the decades since, a more [diverse group of states](#) has been advancing anti-gender goals at the UN. This includes Catholic- and Muslim-majority Latin American and African States, as well as the United States, depending on the political administration. These states largely target the UN’s [political processes](#) where advances on gender are most often made. This includes the Holy See’s [campaigns](#) against abortion, gender equality, SRHR and CSE at [CPD](#), [CSW](#) and [HRC](#). Since the late 2010s, the Holy See’s [ally](#) Russia has become a [driving force](#) of anti-gender organizing at the UN, particularly at HRC. Russia has [taken a leadership role](#) in coordinating countries against gender, forming coalitions with [formal negotiating groups](#) like the African Group, Arab Group and OIC.<sup>3</sup>

---

3. The African Group and the Arab Group are active organizing spaces that advocate from anti-gender positions, and the OIC has been particularly outspoken in recent years. It made its first notable foray into international human rights fora in the early 2000s to advocate against defamation of religion. Since, the [OIC’s engagement with the UN](#) on human rights has largely focused on promoting “pro-family” policies while limiting state accountability for human rights and increasing state impunity for violations. Since the mid-2010s, it has consistently [advocated](#) against sexual orientation and gender identity (SOGI) inclusion in UN documents, partnering with anti-rights CSOs like [FWI](#).

## How member states negotiate at the UN

Most negotiations at the UN are [iterative processes](#) where states debate the wording of policy-setting documents like resolutions or international agreements. The [goal](#) is typically to achieve consensus among states—the strongest expression of common international will. Where states have not yet reached consensus, they can propose [amendments](#) to texts. If after all the changes have been made states still have not reached consensus, a [vote](#) may be called on the entire document or certain sections of it.

In large and complex negotiations, states often negotiate as members of geographical, political, or shared interest [groups](#) where they are represented by a single designated spokesperson. Groups [develop](#) common negotiating aims, positions, and strategies to take advantage of their collective influence. Optically, aligning many states on a single position lends weight to that position and, in the case of anti-gender positions, makes them appear more legitimate.

Anti-gender CSOs are a [significant force](#) driving anti-gender positions at the UN, given their [close relationships](#) with conservative member states. These CSOs are typically religiously affiliated and come from North America and Europe to advocate for heterocentric “traditional” or “family” values at the UN. They include groups like the Center for Family and Human Rights (C-Fam) and [Family Watch International](#) (FWI). These organizations have historically [focused](#) their UN advocacy on spaces where progress has been made, lobbying states’ delegations during negotiations at UNGA, HRC and at conferences like CSW and CPD.

## What motivates anti-gender campaigning at the UN?

Anti-gender CSOs are largely motivated by ideological agendas, but their state allies' [motivations](#) for advocating anti-gender positions are often diverse and change over time. While some states may be motivated by [ideology and religion](#), their behavior at the UN is also driven by national interests, like [political transitions](#) and [shifts in domestic political narratives](#), as well as [geopolitics](#), such as conflicts and regional priorities. Further complicating the landscape, a state can simultaneously adopt [different positions](#) on gender in their domestic and international contexts. This can mean that, for example, a state can take a positive stance on gender equality at the national and regional level but work against it in the UN negotiating room.

## An Emboldened Anti-Gender Movement

The anti-gender movement is [emboldened](#), [well-coordinated](#) and [strategic](#) in global and regional fora. In the last decade, [UN negotiations](#) over gender have become [increasingly fraught](#). Although [considerable progress](#) has been made on SRHR within HRC, treaty monitoring bodies and special procedures,<sup>4</sup> anti-gender campaigning at the UN has [taken a toll](#). Since 2017, language on abortion has disappeared from CSW's yearly negotiated outcome documents; language on CSE has been weakened; and anti-gender language on parents' rights inserted. Similarly, at CPD, state support for SRHR has significantly slipped in the last decade, and some states have attempted to replace SRHR with family-based language.

Meanwhile, civic space is [shrinking globally](#) and there are significant structural barriers to activists' engagement with UN processes, particularly for those from the Global South. Feminist advocates who are able to operate in these spaces have focused their efforts on holding the line on previous agreed language, particularly on contentious issues like abortion and CSE.

---

4. The [HRC special procedures](#) are independent human rights experts who have dedicated mandates to research and report on a variety of thematic or country-specific human rights issues.



As the anti-gender movement grows stronger, it challenges norms that have long enjoyed consensus at the UN. Negotiations over an HRC resolution on the elimination of female genital mutilation in 2022 provides a stark example. This resolution is popular and had been renewed multiple times since it was first introduced in 2013: it was typically one of the [most-sponsored HRC resolutions](#), indicating broad agreement among States. However, the [2022 version](#) sponsored by Andorra, Côte d'Ivoire, Iraq, Monaco, Paraguay and Turkey regressed on previously agreed language.<sup>5</sup> As a result, it became one of the [least sponsored](#) resolutions adopted at that session. There are other examples:

- At the same 2022 HRC session, a resolution on girls' activism was [debated extensively](#) in a [record number of negotiation sessions](#) even though the UN had addressed the issue before. Anti-gender states submitted a barrage of hostile amendments to, among other things, add new language on the family that would weaken girls' ability to participate in public life.
- In 2019, [states debated](#) "sexual and reproductive health" in a Security Council resolution on women, peace and security for four weeks, despite having agreed to include that language in previous resolutions.

---

5. This has spilled over onto the national level. A bill to decriminalize female genital mutilation was [tabled](#) in the Gambia, which—worryingly—is the seat of the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights.

# The Unexpected Trend

After receiving reports of anti-gender activity in unusual UN spaces, Ipas sought to record this emerging trend. Ipas interviewed feminist advocates from civil society who work to advance gender equality, SRHR and LGBTQ+ rights at the UN. From these conversations we identified 13 cases that demonstrate this trend, and which were corroborated with primary evidence (see Table 1, below.) Examples include:

- The [ILO Program and Budget for 2024-2025](#), which [called on](#) ILO to combat discrimination on the basis of SOGI and was nearly rejected as a result, putting the organization's entire future into question.
- A [right to development declaration](#) proposing a new draft international covenant on the right to development; at the request of anti-gender states, "gender equality" [became](#) "equality between women and men," excluding gender-expansive people.
- The draft articles of a [crimes against humanity treaty](#) where anti-gender states have continuously sought to insert a binary gender definition that is widely regarded as [outdated](#).<sup>6</sup>

## Example: Compounding anti-gender disruption at WHO

The WHO has faced anti-gender opposition on its [sexual and reproductive health \(SRH\) initiatives](#), particularly its [Abortion Care Guidelines](#). However, this investigation tracks two cases of anti-gender opposition outside of the WHO's sexual and reproductive health work. In January 2022, Russia and the Eastern Mediterranean States [objected to](#) CSE and references to gender diversity in WHO's new global health sector strategies on HIV, viral hepatitis and sexually transmitted infections. The chair [opened](#) the document for negotiations at Russia's suggestion even though technical strategies are not typically debated.

This led to negotiations throughout the spring: many of the inclusive and evidence-based terms and definitions in the document were lost.

---

6. See [here](#) and [here](#).

When the negotiated document was presented for adoption at the World Health Assembly in May, states [continued](#) to bring anti-gender objections, leading to a [vote being called](#) on a technical strategy for the [first time in UN history](#).

According to an advocate interviewed by Ipas, anti-gender gains in 2022 encouraged states to ramp up these kinds of attacks against WHO. This was demonstrated the following year when anti-gender states [attacked](#) language on SOGI and parental leave in WHO's Program and Budget for 2024-2025 and another document setting regulations and rules for WHO staff. They also attacked the technical global strategy on infection prevention and control. Because the [initial draft](#) of this WHO strategy contained explicit mention of sexual orientation, the chair again [opened](#) a technical strategy for political negotiations, and the inclusive language was scrubbed from the document.

## **A Sharp Rise in Anti-Gender Activity in Unexpected Spaces**

To understand this pattern,<sup>7</sup> the investigation used primary evidence to trace the timing of each case, the member states and groups of states involved, the nature of the anti-gender objections and states' rationales and the ultimate outcomes of anti-gender efforts. This investigation found that anti-gender activity has not only become more common in unexpected UN spaces between 2019 and 2023—it has become more coordinated and systematic. These results support interviewees' and the [media's](#) assertions that the anti-gender movement is escalating its attempts to advance anti-gender goals in unexpected UN spaces.<sup>8</sup>

---

7. As identified earlier, the factors influencing a state's decisions to push anti-gender positions in a UN negotiation are highly variable. Our analysis necessarily ignores the nuances within a state's decision-making process in favor of understanding the cumulative impacts of states' behavior and discourse over time.

8. Five of the six advocates interviewed for this investigation believed anti-gender activity was becoming more prevalent in unexpected UN spaces.

**Table 1: 13 unexpected cases identified between 2019 and 2023<sup>9</sup>**

Date	Case	Details and Tactics
Jan 2019– Apr 2023	1. <a href="#">Crimes against humanity treaty</a>	A group of mostly African and Eastern European States, including Egypt, Senegal and Poland, sought to re-insert an <a href="#">outdated</a> binary gender definition in the draft articles, <a href="#">arguing</a> that there was no other agreed definition of gender and that drafters had <a href="#">gone beyond their mandate</a> and competence.
Oct-Dec 2020	2. <a href="#">CFS voluntary guidelines</a> addressed gender inequality in food security addressed gender inequality in food security	Cameroon, China, Egypt, Indonesia, the Holy See, Malaysia, Russia and Sudan <a href="#">campaigned to remove</a> language on SOGI and language addressing gendered barriers to food security.
Feb-June 2011	3. <a href="#">Global AIDS Strategy</a>	Russia and Iran <a href="#">disassociated</a> from the parts of the strategy that included SOGI, saying they did not use <a href="#">agreed language</a> and <a href="#">conflicted</a> with national legislations and contexts.
Apr-June 2021	4. Political declaration on HIV/AIDS setting <a href="#">new targets</a> for ending AIDS	A diverse group of twenty states including Bangladesh, Guatemala and Russia <a href="#">fought to remove</a> rights- and evidence-based language on ending AIDS, including CSE. Russia <a href="#">called the declaration to a vote</a> for the <a href="#">first time</a> in UN history.
June-Oct 2021	5. WIPO <a href="#">Independent Advisory Oversight Committee Report</a>	Though consensus on this report <a href="#">was not required</a> , states <a href="#">tried to remove SOGI language</a> . Other states found their attempts to negotiate the content of an independent report <a href="#">concerning</a> .
Nov 2021– May 2023	6. <a href="#">Right to development treaty</a>	Early in negotiations, Egypt, Iran, Nigeria and Russia <a href="#">asserted</a> that “gender equality” was not agreed language: it <a href="#">became</a> “equality between men and women” in subsequent drafts.
Jan-May 2022	7. WHO global health sector strategies <a href="#">guide</a> efforts on HIV and more	The draft was opened for negotiations due to <a href="#">opposition</a> to gender language. Despite months of debate, anti-gender states <a href="#">refused</a> to accept the draft and the strategies were put to an unprecedented vote. States <a href="#">took ‘note’</a> of the strategies (rather than adopting them) and agreed to implement them only as was congruent with their national contexts.

9. A matrix containing the full list of cases and all data points gathered is available in Appendix III.


Jan-May 2023	8. WHO global strategy focused on <a href="#">infection prevention</a>	Non-experts were <a href="#">allowed</a> to negotiate this technical document. States called CSE and SOGI <a href="#">not agreed upon</a> and sought exceptions based on <a href="#">cultural context</a> , resulting in the removal of SOGI language.
Jan-May 2023	9. WHO <a href="#">program and budget</a>	Language referencing SOGI was absent from the <a href="#">second</a> draft of the budget after Russia <a href="#">complained</a> about its inclusion in the <a href="#">first</a> . The dispute was resolved behind closed doors, per an advocate.
Jan-June 2023	10. ILO <a href="#">program and budget</a>	Led by Cameroon, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, 88 states <a href="#">attacked</a> SOGI language so forcefully that the debate <a href="#">threatened</a> to deprive the organization of all funding. While the proposal was eventually <a href="#">adopted</a> , it was weakened by a note recognizing states' disagreement.
Mar-Jun 2023	11. WIPO <a href="#">program of work and budget</a>	<a href="#">Contentious negotiations</a> saw “gender equality” replaced with “balance between men and women.”
Jul 2023	12. 53rd HRC resolution <a href="#">strengthening</a> Colombian peace process	Pakistan (on behalf of the OIC) presented an <a href="#">O-p</a> to remove SOGI on a Colombia-specific resolution—against Colombia’s will.
Aug-Sept 2023	13. UNHCR <a href="#">program budget</a>	Likely due to chilling effect of anti-gender attacks, the agency did not include references to SOGI in its program budget or a related paper, even though they had been included in the previous year’s versions of <a href="#">both documents</a> .

The number of cases of anti-gender activity in unexpected spaces has increased year after year. As shown in Table 2, the number of ongoing cases increased from one in 2019—the crimes against humanity treaty—to nine in 2023. In 2023, there were six new documents, resolutions or technical strategies under attack, with three ongoing from the previous years.<sup>10</sup>

---

10. The new cases, as of November 2023, include the 53rd HRC resolution strengthening Colombia’s peace process; the ILO program and budget 2024-2025; the UNHCR program and budget 2024; the WIPO program of work and budget 2024-2025; the WHO global strategy on infect prevention; and the WHO program and budget 2024-2025. The ongoing cases from the previous years that were still being debated at time of writing include the crimes against humanity treaty, the CFS voluntary guidelines and the right to development treaty.

**Table 2: Ongoing cases per year**




**Coordination among Anti-Gender Member States**

The number of states advancing anti-gender goals in unexpected spaces has also increased. As shown in Table 2 above, the number of states raising anti-gender objections in unexpected spaces rose from six in 2019 to 90 in 2023.<sup>11</sup> Those that made the greatest number of objections during this time, in descending order, were Egypt, Iran, Russia, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia and Sudan.

11. As stated above, states' likelihood of taking an anti-gender position varies over time based on myriad factors like domestic politics.

**Table 3: Objecting member states and groups per year**



This evidence shows that states have become more coordinated and are presenting their anti-gender positions jointly, a public alignment that demonstrates a position of strength and numbers.<sup>12</sup> The groups most frequently coordinating are the OIC, the Gulf Cooperation Council and the African Group; together, they represent 83 member states—43 percent of the UN’s total membership of 193 states. Russia and the Holy See are not members of those groups, but they frequently joined these coalition in presenting anti-gender positions.<sup>13</sup>

12. Typically, in UN negotiations, one state will make a statement on behalf of the group. States that do not wish to align themselves with that statement are excluded explicitly. Accordingly, where a statement was made on behalf of a group, all members of that group were assumed to hold views represented by that statement unless an explicit exclusion was made. Where a state was a member of two groups that made anti-gender statements, they were included only once in the count of unique states objecting.

13. For a full list of objectors, see the case details matrix in Appendix III.

## Gender: Any Mention, Anywhere

Sexual and reproductive health and SOGI language has been in the crosshairs for decades at the United Nations. But increasingly, so is the word “gender,” which the anti-rights movement sees as a “[Trojan horse](#)” for a progressive agenda that includes LGBTQ+ rights, women’s rights and a broad understanding of the concept of families. Gender is now systematically attacked, no matter where it appears.

Among the cases studied in this report, anti-gender states objected most frequently to SOGI and to any mention of LGTBQ+ identities, as well as any perceived variation thereof, like the term “men who have sex with men”. States also consistently objected to any language expressing, implying, or perceived to be implying an expansive understanding of gender that contradicts binary gender norms.<sup>14</sup> This reflects the rise in anti-SOGI sentiment—and anti-trans sentiment in particular—that has been [plaguing the UN](#) and other [transnational forums](#) in recent years. Additionally, anti-gender states made consistent objections to any mention of intersectionality, including “multiple and intersecting forms of discrimination.” Lastly, wherever CSE appeared in a document, anti-gender states objected forcefully.<sup>15</sup>

States overwhelmingly justified their opposition to [SOGI](#), [CSE](#) and [intersectionality](#) by claiming that these were not agreed terms enjoying international consensus.<sup>16</sup> They also commonly cited their national sovereignty as a reason for opposing SOGI—saying, for example, that SOGI conflicted with their [national legislations](#) or [constitutions](#). They also [justified](#) their positions based on cultural, moral, or religious grounds. Sometimes, states combined these rationales, as Libya did in 2023, [asserting](#) that the ILO budget process that included references to SOGI interfered with “states’ sovereign right to uphold their cultural, religious, and moral principles.” When opposing gender expansiveness, states most often [argued](#) that there was no internationally agreed definition of gender except for the binary one included in the [outdated](#), decades-old Holy See-driven definition from the Rome Statute. While drafting a new crimes against humanity treaty, anti-gender states [insisted](#) that was the [only agreed definition](#).

---

14. This includes States preferring the use of “sex” over “gender,” objecting to non-binary definitions of gender, and opposing “all women” and “women in all their diversity.”

15. For detailed list of anti-gender objections, see the matrix of case details in the Appendix III.

16. States called these words “[non-consensual](#)” or “[not adopted by consensus](#),” or insisted that they did not “[carry acceptance under existing international human rights law](#).”



More concerning than what anti-gender states have attacked is where they have attacked. “Gender” is now vulnerable wherever it appears, even if found in an administrative or technical document like the ILO program and budget or a WHO global health strategy. Of the 13 cases studied, nine negotiations occurred under the auspices of a UN agency—only four were anti-gender attacks on political processes where anti-gender campaigning has been [more expected](#).

This demonstrates a pattern of anti-gender states deliberately monitoring administrative and technical documents for the offending language. In 2023, the OIC sent three letters to several UN officials protesting SOGI language in technical and administrative documents, including UN agencies’ agenda-setting program and budget documents. One letter targeted ILO;<sup>17</sup> [another](#) admonished the UN Secretary-General for including protections from discrimination based on SOGI in official UN reports and program and budget documents; and a [third](#) with a similar complaint was sent to the executive director of the Joint UN Programme on HIV/AIDS. These letters, as well as a [statement by Russia](#), show a growing dedication to monitoring the entire UN system for gender language.

It is not only states that target gender language. NGOs like Alliance Defending Freedom (a [US Christian Right CSO](#) with an [international branch](#)), C-Fam, FWI and the Italian Christian organization [L’Associazione Comunità Papa Giovanni XXIII](#) all invest heavily in global and regional forums. They cultivate close relationships with the [Holy See](#), OIC<sup>18</sup> and [Russia](#). Already ubiquitous in gender-focused UN spaces, anti-gender NGOs are now more common in unexpected spaces.<sup>19</sup>

This type of anti-rights advocacy is [a feature](#) of supporters and allies of former United States (US) President Donald Trump. For four years under the Trump administration, [efforts to crawl back human rights](#) were the norm at the United Nations (UN). A [2019 investigation](#) identified efforts to curb any reference to “gender” by both the US mission to the UN as well as Member States in the Arab Group—they used talking points directly traced to the anti-abortion group Center for Family and Human Rights (C-Fam).

---

17. Evidence of the letter can be found in the [minutes](#) of a meeting of the ILO’s Governing Body.

18. A 2023 [OIC fatwa](#) cited a book by FWI on advancing “family-based solutions” to global problems at the UN.

19. Interviews with CSO advocates, September-November 2023, on file with Ipas.

The far-right US think tank [Heritage Foundation](#) has also embraced these narratives and approaches to international affairs and human rights. A [key partner](#) to C-Fam and Alliance Defending Freedom in UN and anti-rights spaces, the Heritage Foundation published in April 2022 a 900-page “Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise,” which is the central policy guidance of the foundation’s Project 2025 to shape the next conservative administration in the United States. With directives for every area of US governance from health to foreign policy, Project 2025’s authors also [urge](#) the administration to delete “the terms sexual orientation and gender identity (‘SOGI’), diversity, equity, and inclusion (‘DEI’), gender, gender equality, gender equity, gender awareness, gender-sensitive, abortion, reproductive health, reproductive rights, and any other term used to deprive Americans of their First Amendment rights out of every federal rule, agency regulation, contract, grant, regulation, and piece of legislation that exists.” This not only reflects opposition to ‘gender’ language in line with what happening in UN spaces, but this approach, if adopted, would also have ramification on US interactions in UN political processes, UN financing and the operations of UN agencies.

### **New opposition to old language**

These interventions raise the question of why member states are only now opposing this language when in several cases the language had been present in prior iterations of these documents. In 2023, the OIC and African Group attacked SOGI in the ILO program and budget even though the same protections were incorporated in the [ILO’s programs and budgets](#) since 2018. Similarly, language included in the [2016 political declaration on HIV/AIDS](#) and [WIPO program of work and budget for 2022-2023](#) became subject to anti-gender objections when these documents were iterated upon in 2021 and 2023, respectively.

It is difficult to pinpoint exactly when efforts to advance anti-gender goals in unexpected spaces started ramping up. While some feminist advocates engage with these unexpected spaces, there is not consistent coverage nor any centralized reporting system for mapping the full extent of anti-gender activity within the UN system.

# Implications

The implications of this trend are most severe for the women, girls and LGBTQ+ people worldwide who stand to benefit most from a gender transformative approach to policymaking across all the UN's mechanisms. Anti-gender actors increasingly stand in the way by weakening efforts to address gender through language negotiations. Though many factors contribute to language changes in UN documents, [research](#) on other intergovernmental forums has found that anti-gender states are more easily able to win concessions in unexpected spaces.<sup>20</sup> Indeed, of our 13 cases, six of the final or most recent versions of the negotiated documents had weaker language or required less state accountability than the initial draft presented (or both.)<sup>21</sup>

However, the anti-gender movement is not satisfied with the incremental change it can achieve through language negotiations. Throughout its history of engagement with the UN's gender-focused spaces, the anti-gender movement has [blocked](#) efforts towards gender equality while also progressively [undermining](#) these institutions to the point where they can no longer protect liberal human rights norms.

Many of the anti-gender CSOs driving the escalation in unexpected spaces, including Alliance Defending Freedom, FWI and C-Fam, are products of 20th century [isolationist](#) and [anti-government](#) conservative traditions that opposed the UN's very existence. [Highly critical](#) of the UN, they [engage with it anyway](#) because of the threat it poses to the traditional power structures they seek to

---

20. In 2022, the [Center for Feminist Foreign Policy](#) completed a [study](#) on the impact of anti-gender actors on several European multilateral institutions and HRC. It describes a growing anti-gender movement that is systematically opposing gender equality and LGBTQ+ rights wherever efforts to advance these were made, including in forums dedicated to “unrelated” policy issues like sports and culture. The study found that in these “unrelated” spaces, anti-gender actors were able to win seemingly small concessions that they could then reference in future negotiations. Assuming the anti-gender movement can apply learnings from one multilateral context to another, it may be that anti-gender actors have caught on to the potential of this strategy and are now implementing it more consistently.

21. These included the CFS voluntary guidelines, political declaration on HIV/AIDS, right to development treaty draft articles, WHO global health sector strategies, WHO global strategy on infection prevention and the WHO Program and Budget for 2024-2025.

uphold. Similarly, many of the anti-gender states involved—like some members of the OIC—have a [history](#) of engaging with international human rights mechanisms not to advance rights, but to lower state accountability and create loopholes based on national sovereignty, culture or religion.

Today, anti-gender actors appear so committed to disabling multilateralism that they are willing to sacrifice the efficacy and continued health of the institution involved, no matter what the work of that institution is or how critical. [Unwilling](#) to compromise, anti-gender campaigning has upended the typical or expected UN policymaking procedures, sometimes unprecedentedly, in nearly half of the cases studied.<sup>22</sup> These included [delays](#), [rare political negotiations](#) over technical documents and [budgets](#), agreements adopted by [vote](#) for the [first time in UN history](#) and [hostile amendments](#) shirking decades of multilateral norms.<sup>23</sup> As discouraging as these divergences are, the real threat is deeper. They are blocking present efforts on gender while also undermining the institutions to prevent them from advancing gender and intersectionality in the future. Thus, in its pursuit of its aims, the anti-gender movement now presents a threat to all UN institutions.

### **Weakening States' Alignment on Human Rights Norms**

In the 13 cases studied, anti-gender states attacked gender language, largely by arguing that the terms did not enjoy international consensus. In doing so, [they often misrepresented](#) what was truly agreed-upon language, [describing only weaker language as “agreed.”](#)<sup>24</sup> Anti-gender states have also demonstrated their misalignment with prevailing norms by undermining consensus through

---

22. These are the CFS voluntary guidelines, political declaration on HIV/AIDS, WIPO program of work and budget for 2022-2023, WHO global health sector strategies, WHO global strategy on infection prevention, and the resolution on the Colombia Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) during the 53rd session of HRC.

23. For example, Pakistan submitted a hostile amendment on behalf of the OIC against Colombia's will to a resolution renewing OHCHR Colombian operations that mentioned SOGI. Confidential details are on file with Ipas.

24. Language was also misrepresented in negotiations over the CFS voluntary guidelines (described in the case study above). States also [called](#) the inclusion of SOGI in the ILO program and budget for 2024-2025 unagreed, when in fact the same populations had been referred to in the [two prior program budgets](#), which had been adopted by consensus.

reservations and disassociations.<sup>25</sup> In these cases they have also sought to undermine consensus by calling for a vote, as Egypt did after months of contentious negotiations over the [WHO global health sector strategies \(2022-2030\)](#).<sup>26</sup>

When states succeed in rolling back gender language using these tactics, this harms the individuals whose gender will not be considered in the UN's responses to crimes against humanity or food insecurity, for instance, despite ample evidence that it should be. Weaker language can also be [referenced](#) in future negotiations in a race to the bottom for universal human rights.<sup>27</sup>

Even when states do not win tangible concessions, their discourse alone subverts the international human rights system by weakening states' alignment over what human rights norms are. Disagreement among states is destructive for a system meant to correct for the power imbalance between duty-bearing states and rights-bearing human beings by stewarding international agreement over what human rights norms are and embodying the norms in its institutions. The anti-gender movement [drives a wedge](#) in states' alignment by scrutinizing the rights of women and girls and flatly negating those of LGBTQ+ people. This erodes the normative foundation that gives purpose and authority to the UN's human rights mechanisms.

## **National Sovereignty Against Gender and Human Rights**

States attacked gender language by arguing that what it asked of them was incompatible with national sovereignty or their cultural or religious contexts. This argument is a [central component](#) of their strategies and it has been [used in international human rights forums](#) to reduce state accountability for human rights violations and increase state impunity. A companion to this discourse is

---

25. In nine of the 13 cases in this report, states either [threatened](#) to break consensus or followed through on the threat by logging a reservation or disassociating. Anti-gender member states also disassociated from all or parts of technical documents like the [Global AIDS Strategy](#), the [CFS voluntary guidelines](#), and could only accept the ILO program and budget for 2024 once the drafters added a [note](#) acknowledging the divergence of opinion on SOGI.

26. Russia also [called for a vote](#) on the political declaration on HIV/AIDS, despite months of "[painstaking](#)" negotiations where [73 concessions](#) were made to Russia alone.

27. Anti-gender actors are known to [forum-shop](#) for language that is weaker than existing human rights standards and then [work to spread](#) this language to other forums.

promoting [accusing UN bodies of cultural imperialism](#) and encouraging states to not “cede any sovereignty to them.”<sup>28</sup> For example, C-Fam has called on UN member states to protect their sovereignty against the “woke imperialism” Western elites promote through multilateral institutions, including WHO.<sup>29</sup> Ironically, many of these CSOs are themselves Western actors [exporting oppressive ideologies globally](#).

States have leveraged this discourse to secure carve-outs and exemptions in unexpected spaces. They have weakened the [WHO global health sector strategies](#) by adding provisions allowing states to implement them in line with their national contexts.<sup>30</sup> In another example, Iran [disassociated](#) from parts of the Global AIDS Strategy that it said conflicted with its socio-cultural norms and moral and religious values.

When states excuse themselves from accountability or participation, they weaken their commitment to whatever issue that space addresses. This harms all the individuals who would have benefited from a robust, inclusive and evidence-based response to that issue—not only women, girls and LGBTQ+ people. Assertions of violations of sovereignty also weaken the institution that operates with the consent of states, affecting its ability to achieve its mandate on global health, development or any other given issue.

### **Chilling Effect by Targeting Funding**

Anti-gender states tried to withhold funds from UN entities and block their efforts at advancing gender and deter similar attempts in the future. Of our nine cases where negotiations occurred under the auspices of a UN agency, four were actual or anticipated attacks on agency budgets.<sup>31</sup> This is not a new strategy—

---

28. Anti-gender CSOs also accuse UN bodies of free speech or religious freedom violations. For example, CitizenGO has [petitioned](#) against the crimes against humanity treaty, saying that it will criminalize Christian values.

29. In another example, FWI has [claimed](#) that the West and its “hidden sexual agenda” have “hijacked” various UN agencies.

30. States also made similar attempts to insert provisions on national sovereignty in the [right to development treaty draft articles](#) and the [ILO program and budget 2024-2025](#).

31. These include the ILO program and budget 2024-2025, UNHCR program budget for 2024, WHO program and budget for 2024-2025 and WIPO program of work and budget for 2024-2025.

[budget negotiations](#) are often used to communicate political messages and influence institutions' agendas. Anti-gender CSOs do it as well. They [encourage](#) states to withhold funding to force agencies into compliance with their anti-gender views. It has proven effective for achieving anti-rights ends, for instance in 2019 the UN International Organization for Migration removed references to climate change from its program after the Trump administration threatened it with defunding, according a [leak](#).

This strategy has been [effective](#) in influencing institutions' agendas, but more worryingly, it also has a chilling effect on the institutions' willingness to address gender. Per research by [Center for Feminist Foreign Policy](#), constant anti-gender opposition in unexpected multilateral spaces makes even progressive actors reluctant to put gender on the agenda, lest it lead to delays. Indeed, an interviewee suggested that WHO may have removed SOGI language from its [program budget for 2024](#) during closed-door negotiations to avoid incurring the wrath of the anti-gender movement and jeopardizing its budget approval.<sup>32</sup> Funding attacks can even deter agencies who have not yet been targeted. In 2023, UNHCR removed references to “age, gender and diversity” and SOGI from its program budget for 2024 and a [human resources paper](#) despite similar language appearing in the 2023 versions of both the [program budget](#) and [human resources paper](#). Though UNHCR [reinstated](#) the language after some states [expressed concern](#), it is troubling that it may have censored itself in advance to avoid having its budget become a target.

We are entering a new era where funding attacks can have much broader consequences. The Trump administration's defunding of UN agencies was a productive testing ground, and current efforts are simply an expansion of this strategy. Anti-gender states have historically sought to hollow out the parts of agencies that work on gender or deprive them of their own contributions; Trump did this to the [Organization of American States'](#) human rights bodies and [UN Population Fund](#) as part of its anti-abortion policy.<sup>33</sup> However, in one case, states [refused](#) to approve the ILO's entire program and budget for 2024-2025 because of inclusion of SOGI language. They caused the first vote on the draft budget

---

32. Compare the [initial draft](#) with the [one presented](#) to WHA.

33. For instance, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe has had to fund its gender equality programming with extrabudgetary contributions because of Russia and the Holy See's objections.

to fail, raising [fears](#) that ILO could be [forced to cease functioning](#) on January 1, 2024.<sup>34</sup> As the anti-gender movement becomes more systematic and less willing to compromise, funding attacks that threaten entire budgets will become more common. This is a deliberate raising of the stakes that threatens the institutions targeted as well as all the individuals who stand to benefit from the work of these agencies on issues other than gender.

## Narrowing Institutional Space

Anti-gender actors often [challenge](#) human rights norms on procedural grounds. Basing their arguments on a very narrow reading of the regulations, they [claim](#) human rights are irrelevant or beyond the institution's mandate. This was true of the cases studied here. Anti-gender states sought to prevent the [UNGA](#) from taking a rights-based approach to HIV/AIDS, [WIPO](#) from striving for workplace equity and [WHO](#) from addressing the impact criminalization of same-sex intimacy has on HIV prevalence by claiming that these activities fell outside their mandates. In other cases, they argued that gender is [irrelevant](#) or that these institutions were [duplicating](#) the work of other UN entities by addressing it.<sup>35</sup>

Anti-gender states also sought to erode confidence in the UN by claiming that it has no factual authority or competence on gender, as anti-gender [CSOs](#) often do. For example, Russia sought to discredit CFS as an authority on gender inequality in the context of food security by [calling](#) certain aspects of the CFS voluntary guidelines beyond its competence—see appendix for a detailed case study.<sup>36</sup> Anti-gender states also tried to [discredit](#) UN agencies by

---

34. The member states that brought these anti-gender contentions at ILO are perhaps recognizing, as one advocate speculated, that delegations are sometimes more willing to drop human rights language than set a precedent of voting on a budget that would ideally be adopted by consensus.

35. When discussing protections against discrimination or violence based on SOGI, anti-gender states also claimed explicit mention of LGBTQ+ people was itself discriminatory in negotiations over the [WIPO Independent Advisory Oversight Committee Report from 2021](#), [WHO global health sector strategies](#), [ILO program and budget for 2024-2025](#) and [right to development treaty draft articles](#).

36. Egypt used a [similar tack](#) against the International Law Commission, the body drafting the crimes against humanity treaty articles. Further, states implicitly called into question WHO's credibility as a technical authority when they requested that the [WHO global health sector strategies](#) and [global strategy on infection prevention](#) be opened for negotiations. While such arguments may not have the immediate effect of depriving a UN body of its factual authority, they bring that authority into question.



claiming they're trying to create (and impose) “new” human rights. This serves anti-gender civil society [narratives](#) that the UN and its agencies are [deceitfully pushing](#) sexual rights and “gender ideology” on States against their wishes. It [attempts](#) to frame reproductive rights and the human rights of LGBTQ+ people as [new rights](#) to [invalidate](#) existing norms and laws on the subject.<sup>37</sup>

This narrative justifies their attempts to procedurally restrict these institutions from addressing human rights and gender in their future work. If UN agencies maliciously abuse their authority, so the argument goes, then [states must “reform”](#) them in ways that sharply limit them and subject them to stifling oversight. Even arguments that gender is irrelevant or duplicating other work are effective towards this end. In November 2023, states [barred](#) UNGA’s Second Committee on sustainable development from mainstreaming gender in its activities on the grounds that gender was irrelevant to development, despite [significant evidence](#) to the contrary, and that incorporating it would duplicate [the Third Committee’s social, humanitarian and human rights work](#).<sup>38</sup>

Shrinking the institutional space for gender harms the women, girls and LGBTQ+ people who will no longer benefit from cross-cutting consideration. As anti-gender actors increasingly target the UN’s non-gender institutions with these attacks, they weaken those institutions and therefore their important work on other issues.

---

37. A [sign-on letter](#) organized by the [Political Network for Values](#), an organizing hub of the global far-right, for the 75th anniversary of the Universal Declaration for Human Rights is a prime example. In the letter, Political Network for Values uses sovereignty language in the charter to subvert subsequent UN documents containing language it does not like. Meanwhile, it cherry-picks language from those same documents to justify its restrictive view of human rights where, for instance, rights afforded to “the family” justify the exclusion of marginalized groups. OIC also used this rhetoric in its [letters painting](#) UN agencies, civil servants, and member states as sly operators who are trying to impose new norms “disguised” as efforts to protect against discrimination and violence on the basis of SOGI. Of note, the OIC representative for human rights attended a November 2023 meeting hosted by Political Network for Values at the UN in New York City to commemorate the 75th anniversary of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, speaking out against the so-called “new rights.”

38. As opposed to the [First Committee](#), which tackles disarmament and international security, or the economic and financial responsibilities of the [Second Committee](#).

# Conclusion and Recommendations

The mission creep of the anti-gender movement means that their work is now everyone's problem.

As a growing group of UN member states continue to advance anti-gender goals in the UN's unexpected spaces, the UN's work on development, global health and more is collateral damage. In just five years, anti-gender campaigning has become more common and the number of states attacking gender in these contexts has grown to fifteen times what it was in 2019. They are emboldened by their growing influence and success. This should concern anyone invested in the UN as a place for productive multilateral cooperation on any issue facing the international community.

The threat is not limited to the UN and other multilateral forums. Domestically in the US, the anti-gender movement has shown considerable power to disrupt US policymaking on [foreign spending](#), [global health](#) and even [national security](#). However, the UN and all those invested in it have an opportunity to show the world how to counter this movement with proactive measures that strengthen institutions' transparency, openness and readiness to defend the rights of all.

## Recommendations

From these 13 cases, we highlight key factors that contributed to anti-gender success in unexpected spaces—and suggest strategies to counter them:

### 1. Mainstream gender training for diplomats.

Anti-gender member states are [more easily](#) able to win concessions in these unexpected spaces because delegates have [less experience](#) with gender issues, may not know what the latest agreed language is, underestimate the impacts of a small concession, or be too fatigued by relentless anti-gender campaigning to prioritize gender issues. They are not helped by the relative absence of feminist civil society in unexpected spaces versus the more typical, gender-focused UN spaces.

- Governments should [mainstream training](#) on gender for diplomats working across all issue areas.

- This should include education on gender, SRHR and SOGI and raise awareness of how anti-gender actors exploit the UN's procedural weaknesses to win concessions.
- Training should help delegates remain vigilant against attempts to negotiate documents that should not be negotiated through the political process like independent advisory reports and technical documents.

## **2. Improve intersectional collaboration and information-sharing with CSOs from other social justice and human rights movements.**

Anti-gender states actively [seek out](#) policy debates with less oversight from feminist and LGBTQ+ civil society then work to advance anti-gender goals there.

- Feminist CSOs can counter this by improving [collaboration and information-sharing](#) among CSOs from other social justice and human rights movements that already engage in these unexpected spaces.
- Feminist civil society should partner with these CSOs from other movements to create a system whereby these [CSOs alert feminists](#) and share information on anti-gender activity across the UN system so all partners collaborate on strategic responses.
- The system should include better mapping and reporting, joint strategy sessions and other opportunities for strategic coordination among advocates.
- Civil society should work with delegations to prepare mitigation strategies for upcoming negotiations.

## **3. Encourage advocates and delegations to boldly and consistently counter anti-gender statements.**

Anti-gender member states are coordinating their positions in groups, lending them political weight and making them appear more legitimate.

- Advocates and delegations should craft and share human rights, value-based talking points and narratives for consistent use.
- They should encourage member states that are part of political groups like OIC to disassociate from anti-gender group statements.
- Advocates should encourage group members that have indicated disagreement with the anti-gender group position to become champions of gender among their fellow group members.
- Advocates should provide these states with adaptable resources to counter anti-gender narratives so they can encourage other group members to disassociate too.

Finally, governments that seek to defend the universality of human rights should stand up for the importance of cross-cutting recognition of gender across all the UN’s initiatives and not allow gender to be used as a bargaining chip.

## Future Negotiations to Watch

Feminist advocates and allied delegations should also prepare mitigation strategies for upcoming negotiations where similar activity is likely to take place. Because anti-gender opposition has historically not been expected in these UN spaces, rights defenders have not been prepared to counter it. Being prepared to defend against attacks can [make a difference](#) in policy outcomes.

Below is a partial list of UN spaces that may experience similar anti-gender attention in the near future. These include some of the negotiations discussed in this report that are ongoing. This list also includes negotiations that have not been mentioned but are likely to become targets of anti-gender opposition. In addition to the negotiations listed, advocates should also watch WHO, UNHCR, WIPO and the other UN agencies whose cyclical budget renewal processes have come under assault in recent years; processes are becoming more politicized and may be targeted again in the future. Advocates must prepare to expect anti-gender activity across all thematic areas and processes from political negotiations to the internal staffing policies of UN agencies. Progressive actors should monitor and work against anti-genderism in every UN space and should begin by prioritizing the following.

Date	Negotiation	Rationale
May to June 2024	77th session of WHA	WHAs are becoming more politicized.
May 2024	Pandemic Prevention, Preparedness and Response Accord	<a href="#">Anti-gender CSOs</a> have been working to <a href="#">block member states</a> from ratifying this new treaty.
June 2024	The UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization program and budget renewal	This program attracts anti-gender attention at the regional and global levels. Its budget is up for renewal in June 2024, which will be the first since efforts to attack gender language in budgets have become more systematic.
Sept 2024	Summit of the Future	An anti-gender CSO has indicated it may be engaged here.

2024	Right to Development treaty	Advocates have reported CSO attention to future negotiations on this treaty with the goal of reinserting a binary gender definition.
2024	Extrajudicial, Summary, or Arbitrary Executions resolution	This <a href="#">biennial resolution</a> has drawn <a href="#">anti-gender attention</a> for its SOGI inclusion and will be renewed in 2024.
2025	Elections resolution	This <a href="#">biennial resolution</a> has drawn <a href="#">anti-gender attention</a> for its SOGI inclusion and will be renewed in 2025.
2025	World Social Summit	This <a href="#">summit</a> is looking to address poverty and inequality and promoting full employment and inclusion in line with the Sustainable Development Goals.
2026	High-level meeting on HIV/AIDS	The meetings are held <a href="#">every five years</a> .

# Methodology

To track the prevalence of the perceived trend, Ipas collected all publicly available primary source documents on negotiation proceedings for these 13 cases between 2019 and 2023 and analyzed them in Dedoose, a qualitative analysis software.<sup>39</sup> From these, we sourced information on which anti-gender states were involved (including both member states and observer states), what language or concepts they were objecting to, and what the stated rationale was.<sup>40</sup>

Finally, we used additional primary source documents to add context to the proceeding records. These included negotiated drafts, related UN resolutions and decisions, and third-party media articles. We used these to understand how anti-gender objections impacted the text being negotiated as well as the negotiation process itself.

This approach has limitations. First, because we only included and investigated cases mentioned by advocates, this research can suggest that there is evidence of a trend but cannot confirm it beyond a doubt. It is also possible that recency bias affected which cases advocates recalled. Second, much of the complexities regarding the decisions and motivations of States and how these may change over time has been disregarded because the aim of this research was to track and characterize the perceived trend more generally. Third, this research focused only on attacks on gender equality, CSE and the human rights of women, girls and LGBTQ+ people. It does not speak to the ways other human rights are targeted by a broader anti-rights movement, of which the anti-gender movement is one part. Finally, we should note that data collection ended on November 1, 2023. Some final versions of documents and summary records were not yet available, and videos of proceedings or advance versions were used instead.

---

39. See the matrix of case details in the appendix.

40. Codebook on file with Ipas.

## **Future Research**

Future research should track this trend as it continues to develop. As this research sought only to investigate the overarching trends, future research could look at the behaviors of specific member states advancing anti-gender goals at the UN. In the future, researchers should investigate the ways states that seek to advance gender are responding to this escalation of attacks in unexpected spaces with the aim of discovering which mitigation tactics have been most effective in countering anti-gender efforts. Future research should also investigate whether gender is leveraged as a bargaining chip by anti-gender states and rights-defending states alike in negotiations not focused on it.

# Appendix I: Anti-Gender Opposition at CFS Case Study

The 126 member states at the 46th session of CFS in October 2019 [agreed](#) to address [gender inequality](#) in the context of food security. CFS set out to draft the Voluntary Guidelines on Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment in the Context of Food Security and Nutrition (hereafter the CFS voluntary guidelines) to coordinate the world’s efforts at eliminating this disparity. However, in the years of negotiations that followed, select member states prioritized applying an increasingly prevalent anti-gender worldview over the hunger of the world’s [2.4 billion](#) food insecure people. Rather than helping to build a more inclusive and equitable global response to food insecurity, these states [fought to keep out language](#) that would have improved women’s access to food, attacking it [so relentlessly](#) that they [delayed](#) the process an entire year and ultimately yielded a [weaker set of guidelines](#) than were possible.<sup>41</sup>

During the drafting process, many member states and other stakeholders [sought to outline](#) a [transformative](#) and [inclusive](#) approach to gender inequalities in food security that was [grounded in human rights](#), [addressed women’s gendered barriers](#) to food security and [included lesbian, transgender, intersex, and queer women](#) in its scope. However, they came up against the objections of a group of states including the Holy See, Indonesia, Russia and several others who continuously [worked to weaken or remove](#) language that could have been used to [hold them accountable](#) or set norms that they did not want to follow. These states opposed language that affirmed gender equality, addressing gendered barriers to

---

41. The [number](#) of people who are moderately to severely food insecure has increased each year since data collection began. The [proportion](#) of women who are food insecure has been rising in tandem. [31.9 percent](#) of women worldwide are moderately or severely food insecure compared to 27.6 percent of men. Though women make up [48 percent](#) of those in agricultural employment, they are more food insecure due to lower access to resources, underrepresentation in governance and discriminatory gender norms. The global response to food insecurity cannot reach its goal of ending hunger without ensuring that all efforts directly address the factors that contribute to women’s disproportionate food insecurity.



food security like gender-based violence (GBV) and poor SRH or acknowledged the existence of gender-diverse women, among other things.

These states argued that gender was irrelevant to food security and outside the mandate of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the body that CFS advises.<sup>42</sup> However, FAO's [mandate](#) is to achieve food security, leaving no one behind, and to promote inclusive economic growth by reducing inequalities, [including](#) those between men and women. These anti-gender arguments are particularly empty when used to argue against the inclusion of concepts that have known consequences for women and girls' food security like [GBV](#), [intersectionality](#) and [SRHR](#).<sup>43</sup> Across multiple rounds of draft negotiations, these states also sought to undermine CFS's legitimacy by insisting that it was attempting to impose new concepts and terminology that did not have consensus among CFS member states. To do so, they often misrepresented what constitutes agreed language in a UN negotiation process, complaining that the language they opposed had no international consensus,<sup>44</sup> even when this was false.<sup>45</sup>

After two years of contention, states reached an impasse that forced CFS to extend the process and delay the CFS voluntary guidelines another year, pushing their scheduled presentation from October 2022 to October 2023. To move the negotiations forward, the chair of the drafting group rewrote the CFS voluntary guidelines using only language found in a [resolution](#) on

---

42. See records of statements made by [Malaysia; a group of countries including China, Russia, Sudan, Cameroon and Malaysia; the Holy See in 2021; states](#) present at the Asia and Pacific regional consultation; [the Holy See in 2022; Indonesia in 2021; and Indonesia again in 2022](#).

43. Indonesia objected several times to the use of language related to intersectionality, SRHR, and GBV on the grounds that they were beyond the mandate of CFS and FAO and held no relevance to food security and nutrition. It also objected to the use of GBV as a term, saying it was too broad to be suitable within the context of food security (see [here](#) and [here](#)). Similar complaints against SRHR were also raised in the Asia and Pacific regional consultations.

44. See statements by the Holy See in [2021](#) and [2022](#); Indonesia in [2021](#); Indonesia in [2022](#); [Malaysia in 2023](#); states present at the Asia and Pacific regional consultations; and [states](#) present at the Europe and Central Asia regional consultations.

45. Both [Indonesia](#) and the [Holy See](#) objected to the use of "multiple and intersecting forms of discrimination," calling it not agreed language on the international level even though this phrase is used in a [2021 resolution](#) adopted by UNGA.

the improvement of the situation of women and girls in rural areas, which was adopted by consensus by UNGA in 2021. Though done to avoid greater backsliding, the rewrite was a concession to anti-gender member states. Using only language from this resolution, the [CFS voluntary guidelines](#) could now be no more inclusive or ambitious than UNGA had been two years before. Moreover, the 2021 resolution contains no explicit mention of those with diverse SOGI and, as a result, all inclusion of these populations was dropped from the CFS voluntary guidelines. Member states' willingness to misrepresent this language was further exemplified after the rewrite. Even though UNGA had adopted this resolution by consensus, Malaysia still [said](#) it did not consider some terms agreed language.

Despite numerous concessions to their demands, the Holy See, Indonesia, Russia and others continued to push for the removal of language they opposed.<sup>46</sup> When CFS refused to weaken the language even further, these states [threatened to disengage](#) with the process saying their concerns had not been addressed. When the chair presented the draft for adoption, some anti-gender member states [disassociated](#) from parts of the adopted document.

The contentions over gender language in the CFS voluntary guidelines led to the adoption of a document that was weaker and one year delayed. This has consequences for the [rights](#) and lives of those whose hunger these guidelines were meant to address, but that is not all. By attacking CFS's legitimacy and restricting FAO's ability to fulfill its mandate, these anti-gender assertions also threaten the multilateral institutions that work to alleviate hunger and fulfill the [human right](#) to be free from it. Anti-genderism here spoiled progress on food security and questioned the validity and utility of the UN's mechanisms addressing it. This should concern all those invested in the UN as a space for productive and meaningful international cooperation on anything, not just gender.

---

46. This included language promoting [gender-transformative approaches](#) or encouraging states to consider the [multiple and intersecting forms of discrimination](#) women may face.

# Appendix II: Matrix of Case Details

Case	Date	Process Objective	States and Groups Making Anti-Gender Objections	Objection and Rationale (if given)	Text Implications	Procedural Implications
CFS voluntary guidelines	October to December 2020	The <a href="#">guidelines</a> aimed to provide guidance to UN agencies and states on addressing gender inequality in the context of food security.	ID, RU (2 total)	Gender equality as a human right (no consensus); 'gender-based discrimination' (no consensus); preference for 'sex' over 'gender'; multiple and intersecting forms of discrimination; gender expansiveness (outside mandate)	Some language on gender, sexuality, and reproduction was removed from the terms of reference for the VGGEWs, but most remained. <sup>47</sup>	
	July to December 2021		ID, RU, VA (3 total)	SOGI (outside mandate and no consensus); gender expansiveness (irrelevant); sexual and reproductive health (outside mandate); sexual and reproductive health and rights (outside mandate and irrelevant); multiple and intersecting forms of discrimination; gender-based violence; gender norms; preference for 'sex' over 'gender'; lack of ICPD reference	Some language on gender, sexuality, and reproduction was removed, but most remained. <sup>48</sup>	
	February to October 2022		CN, CM, ID, MY, RU, SD, VA (7 total)	multiple and intersecting forms of discrimination (outside mandate and no consensus); sexual and reproductive health and rights (outside mandate and no consensus); gender-based violence (outside mandate); gender mainstreaming;	The process stalls <a href="#">due to contentions</a> over gender language. After CFS agrees to extend the process another year, a new version of the VGGEWs is drafted <a href="#">using only language</a> found in a <a href="#">2021 UNGA resolution</a> . All SOGI language is lost as a result.	The process was <a href="#">extended</a> for an additional year.
	February to October 2023		EG, ID, MY, MA, VA (5 total)	Gender-based discrimination; gender responsive; gender expansiveness; 'gender' itself; gender-based discrimination; multiple and intersecting forms of discrimination (no consensus and outside mandate); lack of ICPD reference; preference for 'sex' over 'gender' (no consensus)	A <a href="#">final text</a> is agreed with most language on gender, sexuality and reproduction intact, but with no reference to SOGI or gender expansiveness.	When the chair presented the draft for adoption, some anti-gender Member States <a href="#">disassociated</a> from parts of the adopted document.

47. Contrast the draft terms of reference with the revised version.

48. Contrast the final version of the zero draft with the first and second versions of the zero draft.



WIPO Independent Advisory Oversight Committee Report	June to October 2021	This <a href="#">WIPO committee</a> is an external body that assists with Member States' oversight of WIPO's operations. It reports on its activities each year.	BD, IR, PK, RU and SA (5 total)	SOGI (no consensus, redundant, cultural relativism, outside mandate)	Attempts to change the language were unsuccessful.	The Program and Budget Committee was meant to adopt the Independent Advisory Oversight Committee's report contained within the Program of Work and Budget for 2022-2023. However, <a href="#">no decision was taken</a> on the report for the first time in many years due to Member States' inability to find consensus on SOGI language, even though no consensus was required on this report by an independent entity. Some Member States <a href="#">called</a> attempts to negotiate the content of the independent report concerning.
Draft Right to Development Treaty	Nov 2021 to May 2023	The treaty would <a href="#">codify the right</a> in international law and be a step towards implementing the right to development.	2021: NG (1 total) 2022: EG, IR, NG and RU (4 total) 2023: EG, IR, NG and RU (4 total)	2021: Gender-discrimination/-equality (no consensus); gender expansiveness (no consensus) 2022: Gender (redundant), Gender-discrimination/-equality (no consensus) 2023: gender expansiveness; Gender (redundant); gender mainstreaming	In early negotiations, <a href="#">opposition</a> by several Member States resulted in "gender equality" <a href="#">becoming</a> "equality between men and women" in the draft text, erasing those with non-binary identities.	

WHO Global Health Sector Strategy on HIV, viral hepatitis and sexually transmitted infections	January to May 2022	These strategies <a href="#">guide the health sector</a> in strategic responses to HIV, viral hepatitis, and sexually transmitted infections for the period 2022 to 2030.	BD, BY, ID, NE, NG, RU, TR and the Eastern Mediterranean Region group on behalf of its 22 member states (29 total)	CSE (no consensus, national sovereignty), gender expansiveness, SOGI (no consensus), gender (no consensus), sexual rights (no consensus, outside mandate), IPV (national sovereignty)	Many references to gender, harm reduction, IPV and CSE were removed, with only one broad reference to CSE remaining. All but one SOGI reference was removed. The glossary defining these terms was also removed. <sup>50</sup>	Due to contention over gender language at the January 2022 <a href="#">WHO Executive Board meeting</a> , the GHSS was not sent to WHA75 and was instead opened for negotiations. Despite months of negotiations in the interim, that produced two <a href="#">revised documents</a> , Member States continued to object at the WHA75 in May 2022. As a result, the GHSS was put to a vote, a first for a technical WHO strategy. In the end, <a href="#">states 'noted'</a> (rather than 'adopted') the strategies and agreed to implement them in line with their national contexts.
WHO Global Strategy on Infection Prevention and Control	January to May 2023	This strategy was developed to <a href="#">improve global infection prevention and control</a> , with a focus on infection prevention and control at health care delivery points.	RU, LY, NG and the Eastern Mediterranean Region group on behalf of its 21 member states (24 total)	CSE (cultural relativism, no consensus, redundant), gender expansiveness (cultural relativism, redundant), SOGI (no consensus)	SOGI language was removed from the Global Strategy through consultations with Member States. <sup>51</sup>	Negotiations on the Global Strategy were <a href="#">allowed</a> , even though it was a technical document not a political one, resulting in SOGI language being removed. A vote on the strategy was taken at WHA76.

50. Compare the initial and final versions.

51. Compare the initial draft with the final one.

WHO Program Budget 2024-2025	January to May 2023	<a href="#">Sets the priorities</a> of the WHO, defines and monitors targets, and decides the amount of resources required for this work.	RU (1 total)	SOGI (no consensus)	Language referencing “sexual and gender minorities” was removed from the PB24-25 in negotiations that reportedly happened behind closed doors, though a commitment to SRHR remained. <sup>52</sup>	
ILO Program and Budget 2024-2025	January to June 2023	<a href="#">Sets out the ILO’s strategic objectives and expected outcomes</a> , and authorizes budget expenditure.	RU (1 total) BY, CN, GT, RU, Africa Group on behalf of its 54 Member States, Arab Group on behalf of its 20 Member States, GCC on behalf of its 6 Member States, OIC on behalf of 56 of its Member States, SADC on behalf of its 16 Member States (88 total)	SOGI (no consensus, redundant, not universal, violates national sovereignty, cultural relativism, wrong place, outside mandate, coercion, individual choice, not important)	The ILO Program and Budget Proposal for 2024-2025 was <a href="#">adopted</a> by consensus with a note acknowledging divergent views on the inclusion of protections against discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity.	There was contentious debate over the inclusion of “sexual orientation and gender identity” in the ILO Program and Budget Proposal for 2024-2025 that <a href="#">threatened</a> to deprive the ILO of the funds needed to continue functioning in 2024. Several hostile <a href="#">amendments</a> were proposed at <a href="#">multiple stages</a> in the process, but all failed, some with slim margins.
WIPO Program of Work and Budget 2024-2025	March to June 2023	<a href="#">Proposes concrete actions</a> to correspond with the strategic plan and outlines expenditure for WIPO in the upcoming biennium.	IR, PK, RU, SA and the African Group on behalf of its 54 Member States (58 total)	gender expansiveness (no consensus, redundant)	Language promoting “gender equality and diversity” among WIPO staff became “to promote balance and diversity in the WIPO workforce, in particular with respect to equitable geographical representation and gender equality” in <a href="#">contentious negotiations</a> that saw efforts to remove “gender equality” in favor of a “balance between men and women.”	

52. Compare the initial draft with the one presented at WHA76.

Resolution on the Colombia OHCHR during the 53rd session of the HRC	July 2023	This resolution aimed to <a href="#">strengthen OHCHR's assistance</a> with the Colombian peace process.	The OIC on behalf of its 57 Member States (57 total)	SOGI (no consensus, cultural relativism, individual choice, wrong place, not universal)	Pakistan <a href="#">introduced</a> an oral amendment on behalf of the OIC to replace SOGI with “those in vulnerable situations,” but it failed and the language was retained.	According to an advocate, Pakistan and the OIC went against multilateral principles by presenting an amendment on a country-specific resolution presented by the country concerned that was against that country’s will.
UNHCR Program and Budget 2024	August to September 2023	Sets out the program plan for the upcoming year and approves the necessary budget for the agency’s global, regional, and country programs.	<i>[Publicly available records did not identify Member States.]</i>	SOGI (unknown rationale)	Likely due to self-censorship, UNHCR did not include references to “age, gender and diversity” in the <a href="#">UNHCR Program Budget for 2024</a> nor references to sexual orientation and gender identity the <a href="#">Human Resources paper</a> , even though they had been included in the previous year’s version of <a href="#">both documents</a> . But, after delegations <a href="#">expressed concern</a> , the language on age, gender and diversity was <a href="#">restored</a> to the Program Budget for 2024.	



# Appendix III: Country Codes

<b>BD</b>	Bangladesh
<b>BY</b>	Belarus
<b>CM</b>	Cameroon
<b>CN</b>	China
<b>EG</b>	Egypt
<b>GM</b>	The Gambia
<b>GT</b>	Guatemala
<b>VA</b>	Holy See (Vatican City State)
<b>ID</b>	Indonesia
<b>IR</b>	Iran, Islamic Republic of
<b>IQ</b>	Iraq
<b>LY</b>	Libya
<b>MY</b>	Malaysia
<b>MA</b>	Morocco
<b>NI</b>	Nicaragua
<b>NG</b>	Nigeria
<b>PK</b>	Pakistan
<b>PL</b>	Poland
<b>RU</b>	Russian Federation
<b>SA</b>	Saudi Arabia
<b>SN</b>	Senegal
<b>SD</b>	Sudan
<b>SY</b>	Syrian Arab Republic
<b>TG</b>	Togo
<b>TR</b>	Türkiye
<b>UZ</b>	Uzbekistan

**Ipas** Partners for  
Reproductive Justice

P.O. Box 9990, Chapel Hill, NC 27515 USA

 1.919.967.7052

 [ContactUs@ipas.org](mailto:ContactUs@ipas.org)

[www.ipas.org](http://www.ipas.org)